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Executive summary
The seeking of protection from creditors by turning 
to the courts is perfectly legal, but for a conventional
business would normally be ‘clutching at a last straw’.
Increasingly since 1986, with the introduction of new
insolvency legislation, it has been a regular feature of
business activity in English football. Among 
members of Football League Division 1 and Division 2
for the 2008-09 season, more than half have 
suffered an insolvency event in recent years. This
paper reports on the second phase of a major 
research project into insolvency events in English
football clubs, both professional and semi-professional.
Through a review of the development and
commercialisation of football, the difficulty of applying
theory developed for conventional profit-seeking
sectors is identified, as is the need for a methodology
that incorporates both aggregative quantitative
approaches and qualitative approaches that recognise
the uniqueness of each club.
From the findings of both the first phase of the
project, reported initially as Beech, Horsman and
Magraw (2008), and the more intensive second
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phase, a series of five types of insolvency are
identified: clubs that have failed to cope with
relegation; clubs that have failed to pay monies due 
to the UK government (in the form of taxes, National
Insurance contributions etc); clubs that have seen ‘soft
debts’ become ‘hard debts’; clubs that have lost the
ownership of their stadium; and the ‘repeat offenders’.
The paper concludes with an indication of the lines
of research to be undertaken in the third and final
phase of the wider research project, and an indication
of the implications of the research findings so far for
other professional sports.
Introduction
Facing financial difficulty is not a problem unique to
English football (i.e. Association Football) clubs. The
scale at which English football clubs now enter
Administration (court protection from their creditors),
however, is now so great that it might almost be seen
as a legitimate business tactic. Although clubs have,
since 2003, faced points deduction for following this
course of action, there are increasing calls for
automatic relegation from the chairmen of some clubs,
including Graham Turner of Hereford United and Barry
Hearn of Leyton Orient. They argue that clubs entering
Administration have been ‘spending money that they
have not got’, thereby gaining an unfair advantage.
While this is not a universally held view, the fact that
it is promulgated is evidence that some see a scandal
in the way that many English football clubs are run. 
Football clubs facing financial difficulties are
certainly not a new aspect of the game. After the
Football Association reluctantly allowed
professionalisation in 1885, and indeed for some
years before this, when illegal payments to supposedly
amateur players had become almost the norm in a
number of the clubs who would come to dominate the
professional game, cashflow (and profit and loss)
became an inevitable issue. Most clubs changed their
legal format to become limited companies because the
responsibility of maintaining payments to their
employees, the now openly professional players, and
to suppliers, placed the owners of the clubs in a
financially vulnerable position.
In the early days of the professional game the
challenge to balance the books, let alone make a
profit, proved too much and some clubs were wound
up, unable to continue as viable businesses. By the
time of the resumption of professional football at the
end of the First World War, however, the professional
game had shaken down to a reasonable level of
stability among the surviving clubs. It was not until
1962, when Accrington Stanley resigned from the
Football League because of debts of £63,000 which
could not be met, that insolvency reappeared as a real
threat to English clubs.
From that time until the mid-1980s, the threat of
insolvency remained a rarity. When a financial crisis
loomed, clubs tended either to negotiate deals with
their creditors or, in the more extreme cases, to
liquidate themselves voluntarily, only to reappear
promptly with a new or even the same owner 1.
Normally the club, in effect, reappeared with a new
variation of its name for the business, typically adding
the year in brackets to distance themselves from the
club’s previous manifestation yet maintain social
continuity for the sake of the fans. Examples include
Wolverhampton Wanderers (1982), Charlton Athletic
(1984), Middlesbrough (1986) and Fulham (1987).
The introduction of the 1986 Insolvency Act, and
more recently the 2002 Enterprise Act, provided a less
drastic option for any business seeking protection from
its creditors. An Administrator could be appointed by
the courts with the brief to attempt to rescue the
business. While this might often still lead to a change
in ownership, it allowed the business to continue
trading while the Administrator negotiated with the
creditors to find an acceptable level of debt settlement.
Insolvency in English football
1 Known in the accounting trade as ‘phoenixing’, this is a process which, despite various safeguards, is still wide open to abuse. The case of the £10
buyout of Rover from BMW by the “Phoenix Consortium” is one of the most notorious, when Rolls Royce ran out of cash in 1971.
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Once this had been achieved, the business entered a
Companies Voluntary Agreement (CVA) with the
creditors, with a legally binding schedule for
repayment, and control of the company passed from
the Administrator back to the owner(s), whether the
original owner(s) or new owner(s) who had bought the
business from the Administrator.
In English football today there are two specific
consequences of a club ‘going into Administration’ or a
similar insolvency event:
• Points deduction
For most leagues the sanction is the deduction of
10 points, although the Premier League only
sanctions a deduction of nine points.
• Requirement to exit from Administration 
into a CVA
This sanction has been introduced to ensure that
an acceptable agreement has been reached with
the club’s creditors.
The term ‘insolvency event’ is used so that
circumstances similar to entering Administration are
also covered. The definition of ‘insolvency event’ used
by the Football League is given in Exhibit 1.
Because the process of entering Administration is
designed to help ailing businesses rather than hard-
pressed creditors, it is seen as a relatively soft option
by football’s governing bodies. Perhaps more than in
any other business sector, survival of the business, i.e.
the club, is seen as highly desirable. That is not to say
that totally insolvent clubs have not been allowed to
go to the wall, but it is a relatively rare event, with the
two most recent cases (Aldershot Town and Maidstone
United) occurring as long ago as the early 1990s.
Sanctions were introduced following a spate of
insolvencies in 2002 to act as a deterrent to clubs
going down this route and potentially failing to meet
their debts in full – ‘spending money they didn’t have’. 
Clubs such as Boston United, Leeds United and
Leicester City were perceived as having exploited the
new rules in order to minimise the impact. If a club
entered Administration when it was already hovering
on the brink of relegation, it was desirable from the
club’s perspective to have the points deducted during
the current season; in effect, the deduction would
have no impact. New regulations established a ‘cut-off
point’ of the third Thursday in March, after which a
club entering Administration would suffer the
deduction of points in the following season. 
The literature context
Although the failure of a business is clearly a topic
worthy of research, it was not until Argenti (1976)
that a formal analysis of business failure was made.
He highlighted the importance of distinguishing
between the causes of failure and the symptoms of
failure. This research project acknowledges that its
focus is on the symptoms of failure, and that any
causal relationship between symptom and cause will
be, at best, tentative.
The project also draws to some extent on the
approach supported by Anheier and Moulton, who
argue that there are distinct approaches to the study of
failure: organisational, political, cognitive and
structural (Anheier & Moulton, 1999a, 1999b). This
work in the football sector, however, suggests that
these approaches are less distinct and are in fact inter-
related. Anheier and Moulton further suggest that
there are four aspects of failure to be explored:
concept, cause, process and implications.
Because it involves a specific legal process,
bankruptcy, which in the context of this study includes
the liquidation of incorporated bodies, is the most
studied form of failure, and many studies have
explored organisations in this category. Related terms
are ‘insolvency’, which is best thought of as
bankruptcy without the legal process that pushes an
organisation over the edge, and ‘financial distress’, but
these states are not sufficiently clear-cut to be easily
researched; indeed, such states are normally
concealed as far as possible. Because we are
conducting a qualitative study and are particularly
interested in behaviour at the margins, we are going to
use these words precisely and as follows:
Insolvency in English football
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• Bankrupt/in liquidation: the situation whereby due
legal process control of an organisation has passed
from its directors to an outside independent party,
normally known as an Administrator (hence the
state of being ‘in Administration’) or Receiver, who
acts in the interests of the creditors.
• Insolvent: unable to meet your obligations as they
fall due. The most high-profile recent UK
insolvency was the Channel Tunnel. The creditor
banks were owed billions of pounds but it suited
them to influence the directors rather than to
appoint a Receiver and, indirectly, to receive
ownership of a hole in the ground. Broadly this
definition incorporates the definition of ‘insolvency
event’ given in Exhibit 1.
• Financially distressed/illiquid: short of money. 
By their nature these are not precise terms.
• Liquid: with surplus cash, for example after a
small club sells a star player or has an unexpected
cup run.
Authors have tended to try and associate bankruptcy
with the study of a particular business facet, such as
cash-based fund flows (Aziz et al, 1988), agency and
prospect theory (D’Aveni, 1989a, 1989b), governance
structures (Daily & Dalton, 1994), inter-organisational
linkages and financial leverage (Sheppard, 1994) and
a variety of factors (Daily, 1994).
The prediction of bankruptcy through the use of
financial data has prompted considerable research.
Altman developed a model that offered a reasonable
degree of success in predicting bankruptcy two to
three years ahead of the event (Altman, 1968). This
model was refined and adapted for use in the United
Kingdom by Taffler and Tisshaw. Among the examples
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Insolvency in English football
‘INSOLVENCY EVENT’ REFERS TO ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:
A A MANAGER, RECEIVER, ADMINISTRATOR, ADMINISTRATIVE RECEIVER, LIQUIDATOR, PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATOR OR SUPERVISOR TO A
VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT IS APPOINTED IN RESPECT OF A FOOTBALL CLUB OR ANY PART OF ITS UNDERTAKING OR ASSETS
B A FOOTBALL CLUB APPLIES FOR AN ADMINISTRATION ORDER (AS DEFINED IN SECTION 10 OF SCHEDULE B (I) OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT
1986) OR AN ADMINISTRATION ORDER IS MADE IN RESPECT OF IT OR IT OTHERWISE ENTERS INTO ADMINISTRATION
C A WINDING-UP ORDER IS MADE IN RESPECT OF A FOOTBALL CLUB
D A FOOTBALL CLUB ENTERS INTO ANY ARRANGEMENT WITH ITS CREDITORS OR SOME PART OF THEM IN RESPECT OF THE PAYMENT OF
ITS DEBTS OR ANY OF THEM AS A COMPANY VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT (UNDER THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986 OR INSOLVENCY ACT
2000) OR A SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT (UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1985)
E A FOOTBALL CLUB PASSES A RESOLUTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 84 (I) (C) OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986 TO THE EFFECT THAT IT
CANNOT BY REASON OF ITS LIABILITIES CONTINUE ITS BUSINESS AND THAT IT IS ADVISABLE TO WIND UP
F A FOOTBALL CLUB CEASES OR FORMS AN INTENTION TO CEASE WHOLLY OR SUBSTANTIALLY TO CARRY ON ITS BUSINESS SAVE FOR THE
PURPOSE OR RECONSTRUCTION OR AMALGAMATION OR OTHERWISE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEME OF PROPOSALS THAT HAVE
PREVIOUSLY BEEN SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED IN WRITING BY THE BOARD
G A FOOTBALL CLUB CONVENES A MEETING OF ITS CREDITORS PURSUANT TO SECTION 95 OR SECTION 98 OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
EXHIBIT 1 Definitions of ‘insolvency event’
Football League, 2004.
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they said would have been predictable with their
model was the 1973 collapse of Court Line (Taffler &
Tisshaw, 1977). Altman further developed his
predictive model (Altman et al, 1977), and it has
been still further developed more recently by
Zopounidis and Dimitras (1998).
Morris (1998) casts doubts, however, on the
accuracy of such models, because of the high rate of
misclassification error, their self-fulfilling nature, and
the fact that many bankruptcies are due to
‘unforeseeable’ circumstances.
The particular nature of sport as business –
exemplified in the Commission of the European
Communities’ White Paper on Sport (2007), which
argues that there is a ‘specificity’ to sport – suggests
that application of general theoretical frameworks may
be problematic. The general literature therefore offers
less than might be hoped for and is unlikely to be a
fertile source for research in a sub-sector where the
profit motive is not paramount and is balanced with
the desire for sporting success. Many of the ‘investors’
in football clubs do not expect a return or repayment. 
The argument that individual sectors need individual
‘recipes’ has been well rehearsed by Spender (1989,
1998), and an objective of this project is to produce
an individual analysis of insolvency – individual in that
it is recognised from the outset that it is highly unlikely
that it will be generalisable beyond the sports industry. 
Within the football sector, interest in the
performance nexus – on the pitch and in financial
terms – grew as the post-commercialised phase of
business evolution emerged following the formation of
the Premier League and the first BSkyB broadcasting
rights contract (Beech, 2004). Within a decade there
was an extensive literature (see, for example, Conn,
1997; Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999; Hamil at al,
1999; Morrow, 1999; and Hamil et al, 2000) but the
emphasis was in general on success or on lack of
success. Two more recent examples from the literature
do focus on failure: Buraimo et al (2006) and Emery
& Weed (2006). They are of particular interest in that
they adopt strongly different approaches. While
Buraimo et al concentrate on the analysis of
aggregated financial data with relatively little
consideration of individual clubs, and are thus entirely
quantitative, Emery and Weed begin from this
perspective but then focus on a single case study (of
Lincoln City), considering both the financial failure and
the subsequent recovery. 
While both these contrasting approaches are
attractive and insightful, it is clear that a methodology
covering both aggregated and individual data and
quantitative and qualitative data is likely to give the
richest analysis. This research project uses both and
thus offers a new approach to the subject.
Methodology
The originally planned methodology for this research
project has been described elsewhere (Beech et al,
2008). It is summarised as a three-phase project:
1. An exploratory phase to define the scope of the
project. This included identifying the temporal
scope – the date from which the study should
begin – and the spatial scope – in particular,
whether to look at football in Britain or just in
England. Once the temporal scope had been
identified, a timeline of relevant external events
was to be developed.
2. A phase of data gathering and analysis. Data
gathering consisted of identifying all instances of
insolvency during the chosen period, building a
mini case study of each instance, identifying the
factors which proved relevant in each case,
mapping the data gathered together with any
further data identified as being needed for the
investigation, and mapping this data into a
database. The structure of the database would be
such that it could be sorted in ways that would
lead to the identification of types2 of club
insolvencies.
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2 The term ‘type’ has been chosen over ‘ideal model’ or ‘exemplar’ in order to avoid a positive connotation.
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3. In a third phase, each type would lead to specific
clubs being identified for deeper investigation,
involving interviews with key decision-makers in
individual insolvencies.
The first phase has been reported in Beech, Horsman
and Magraw (2008). The current paper updates the
findings and then reports on the types that have been
identified so far in Phase 2. It should be made clear
that the types are not mutually exclusive; rather, some
clubs can be characterised under more than one type,
suggesting that there may be causal connections
between the types.
Scope of project
The original scoping of the project had defined the
time period to be investigated as being from the
introduction of the 1986 Insolvency Act. However, a
number of insolvency events that occurred in the early
1980s have emerged. The timeframe has therefore
been extended as far back as to begin with the demise
of Accrington Stanley in 1962, the first collapse of a
major club since the early years of the game. This has
resulted in a database that includes 96 instances of
insolvency events, involving 79 clubs. Of these clubs,
69% had played in the top four tiers, and 85% in the
top five flights.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of insolvency events
in each season in recent times, up to and including
the case of Darlington going into Administration on 
25 February 2009. At this point in the season only
Darlington and Ringmer had entered Administration,
although winding-up orders had been posted against
several other clubs and it is likely that by the end of
the season a second peak will have emerged.
Although the collapse of ITV Digital on 27 March
2002 received considerable coverage in the immediate
aftermath as a cause of Administrations, the evidence
from the current research suggests that its role was
more as a catalyst than as a direct cause. The number
of Administrations per season was already on the rise,
and examination of individual cases reveals that most
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FIGURE 1 Insolvency events by season
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clubs that faced insolvency events in the year after the
ITV Digital collapse had debts that were considerably
higher than the loss of revenue from broadcasting
rights.
Before the data were reviewed to identify types, an
attempt was made to establish whether there were any
features of the circumstances of the insolvency events
that might be described as broadly symptomatic of all
insolvency events. In the absence of any
benchmarking data for other business sectors, it
proved problematic to identify any that were unique or
even unusual for the football sector. However, the
following are noted as worthy of further research in a
multi-sector context:
• Incidences of liquidation were unusual, especially
among clubs in the higher (professional) tiers.
Where a club was liquidated, it was normally
resurrected through the efforts of supporters, 
re-entering the league pyramid several tiers down.
Until the 1980s, however, liquidation and
immediate re-formation at the same point in the
pyramid was not uncommon.
• The exit from Administration generally arose
through a new owner buying the club from the
Administrator. The success of the new owner was
often a function of the extent to which debts had
been written off, a process which lately happens
through a mandatory Company Voluntary
Agreement (CVA).
• The football sector is increasingly being served by
insolvency practitioners who are specialising in
football clubs. Such specialists include Begbies
Traynor (7 occurrences), Kroll Buchler Phillips and
their predecessors (10), and PKF (3). 
Against this general background, five types have been
identified.
Type 1: Clubs that have failed to cope
with relegation
There is a cost to being relegated. There are the drops
in matchday revenues and merchandising that result
from fans drifting away from the club, and there is a
significant incremental drop in broadcasting revenues,
the biggest of which results from relegation from the
Premier League to the Championship. 
Although parachute payments have been introduced
as a softening of the blow, they may prove inadequate
for a club that has not planned for the possibility of
relegation, and may in any case lead to the ‘bounce
back’ or ‘yo-yoing’ phenomenon, where clubs
repeatedly move between the same two divisions in
consecutive seasons. To match these drops in income
a club must reduce its costs, most notably its salary
bill. This is frequently problematic:
• Most contracts between clubs and players are mid-
term in nature while playing success is short term,
resulting in clubs having an inability to flex their
cost base as their revenue changes.
• Many clubs never do scenario budgeting. They
stumble into a relegation plan rather than having
plans and flexibility based upon all eventualities.
• Clubs may have ‘panicked’ into purchasing players
they can ill afford in an attempt to stave off
relegation. A notable example was the case of
Bradford City, relegated from the Premier League in
2001. Chairman Geoffrey Richmond described the
period fighting relegation as “six weeks of financial
madness” (Guardian, 2002), a reference in
particular to the club’s purchase of Benito Carbone
in August 2000 for a signing on fee of £2m and a
further £4m over four years.
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• Until very recently clubs failed to include negative
performance-related clauses in players’ contracts.
In the case of Bradford and Carbone, the club was
committed to paying Carbone at the rate of
£40,000 per week even after relegation.
By the summer of 2004 Bradford City were in
Administration for the second time and were having to
ask players to defer their wages.
A third characteristic identified was the high-risk
strategy and related phenomenon of clubs buying
players immediately after relegation in the hope that a
bolstered squad would enable the club to achieve
promotion within one season.
In 20 cases the insolvency event occurred within a
year of relegation. A further five occurred in the
second year and eight in the third year. In summary,
33 of the 96 insolvency events (34%) occurred within
three years of relegation.
In a smaller number of cases promotion had also
proved problematic; indeed, ‘yo-yoing’ between
divisions ensures a club lacks the stability for effective
financial planning. Swansea Town, for example, who
were promoted on five occasions and relegated on five
in the period from 1981 to 2008 faced insolvency
events in 1985 and 2003. Similarly, between 1977
and 1989 Wolverhampton Wanderers were promoted
four times and relegated four times; the club faced two
insolvency events in this 12-year period.
Type 2: Clubs that have failed to pay
monies due to the government
Clubs, like any business, incur liabilities to the
government. First, they collect Value Added Tax (VAT)
for the services they provide. The monies collected
thus belong to the government and the club is merely
collecting and holding them on the government’s
behalf. Second, a series of payments which might
loosely be termed taxation, accrues. The largest of
these is likely to be the income tax on employees,
notably from players’ salaries and normally deducted
from salaries under the Pay As You Earn (PAYE)
scheme. Other liabilities to the government include
National Insurance deductions from employees’
salaries. If a club sells its stadium or training ground,
it may be liable to pay Capital Gains Tax.
Until April 2005 two UK government agencies were
involved – the Inland Revenue and Customs & Excise.
Now the two bodies operate as a single agency, Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). Under UK
law the agencies used to enjoy a ‘preferred creditor’
status – in the event of Administration or even
liquidation they had a right to monies due to them in
preference to other creditors. In September 2003 they
lost this status following a change in the law. In
practice this meant that since then they have had a
less preferential status than ‘football creditors’ (for
example, clubs owed money as unpaid transfer fees).
Football creditors include clubs, players and leagues,
but not managers or other members of the club’s non-
playing staff. This is a strong rule to enable the football
authorities to prevent unfair use of Administration to
buy success on the pitch and then not pay for it. On
the one hand it provides the governing body with a
strong control mechanism, but it means that payments
will be paid to football creditors in priority to, for
example, monies collected by the club on behalf of
HMRC in the form of VAT.
In response to this change in status HMRC has
increasingly opposed proposed CVAs that would see
them forced to accept low levels of repayment.
In this context it might be expected that football
clubs would be conscientious in making payments due
to the government. Although details of debts due in
insolvency events are not always in the public domain,
some information has been reported in 62 instances –
52 (84%) of these included debts due to the
government agencies. There is little evidence to show
any change in attitude either in 2003, with the
change in the law, or in 2005, with the change in
organisation of the agencies. 
The picture that emerges is thus one of a cavalier
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attitude to payment and a willingness to drift into
confrontation. There is very limited evidence that
winding-up orders have been fought and a mutually
acceptable payment schedule negotiated, for example
in the cases of Southend United in 2000 and Grimsby
Town in 2004. In the latter case the debt was
reported to be close to £500,000. This suggests that
football clubs not only tend to be reluctant payers but
also reluctant negotiators.
It may be the case that clubs are crisis managers
rather than planners, a view supported by the industry
observations of one of the authors.
Type 3: Clubs that have seen ‘soft’ debt
become ‘hard’ debt
A business model in which a football club becomes
dependent on the largesse of a benefactor-owner has
become increasingly common. The most notable
example is Chelsea, where Roman Abramovich is
reported as having sunk half a billion pounds into the
club in the form of ‘soft’ debt, i.e. debt which will not
be called in. While the Chelsea case is exceptional in
its scale, many clubs operate business models that
would be unsustainable without a benefactor. The
presence of a benefactor has a secondary positive
impact in that his presence on the Board of the club
facilitates borrowing by acting as a guarantor.
The limitation of this business model is reached
when the ‘soft’ debt becomes ‘hard’ debt. It is the
frequent cause of an insolvency event as the speed
with which support is withdrawn may be dramatic.
This instability in a club’s finances can result from a
number of circumstances:
• the death of the benefactor (e.g. Sir Jack Hayward
at Wolverhampton Wanderers)
• the withdrawal of the benefactor through personal
circumstances (e.g. Thaksin Shinawatra at
Manchester City)
• the failure of a benefactor to provide the support
promised (e.g. Spencer Trethewy, Aldershot Town)
• the withdrawal of a benefactor through age 
(e.g. Ken Booth, Rotherham United)
• the loss or shift in interest of the benefactor 
(e.g. Vic Green from Hendon to Stevenage Borough
and Graham Westley from Farnborough to
Stevenage Borough)
• the sudden loss in wealth of the benefactor 
(e.g. the Kumar brothers, Birmingham City, and
Mike Connett, Northwich Victoria).
All examples except the first two have triggered
insolvency events.
Type 4: Clubs that have lost the
ownership of their stadium
The conversion of ‘soft’ debt into ‘hard’ debt is often
precipitated by the transfer in ownership of the club’s
stadium, or less frequently its training ground, from
the club to its owner, particularly in the case of
withdrawing owners – Rotherham United and
Northwich Victoria noted above fall into this category.
Owning one’s stadium is a basis for better financial
stability, and losing that ownership has three possible
negative financial implications:
• the reduced asset base lowers the club’s credit
rating, making it more difficult to take on loans or
continue with an overdraft
• opportunities for income through stadium- and
stand-naming rights are closed to the club
• unless the tenancy of the stadium has an
exclusivity clause, the club may have to see
revenue-generating non-football events taking place
in the stadium for the benefit of others.
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While the shift in ownership may be an enforced and
understandable outcome of benefactor withdrawal, the
data revealed a worrying number of instances of bad
management and even unethical and/or illegal
practices. Examples in clubs subsequently involved in
insolvency events include:
• Barrow 
Ownership of the stadium had passed to owner
Stephen Vaughan’s company, Vaughan Promotions,
and was only returned to the club following legal
action by the Administrator.
• Brighton and Hove Albion
The Goldstone Ground was sold for development
because the club was in severe financial
difficulties. However, this was completed before
alternative arrangements had been made, and the
club became nomadic for a number of seasons.
• Leeds United
Again because of severe financial difficulties, the
Elland Road stadium and the Thorp Arch training
complex were sold in 2004 on a sale-and-lease-
back basis with an option to buy back. In 2009
the stadium is in the ownership of the Teak Trading
Company, based in the British Virgin Islands.
• Wrexham
The then owner, Alex Hamilton, sold the club’s
stadium for redevelopment. As in the case of
Barrow, the club only regained ownership through
legal action by the Administrator.
These are in marked contrast to cases where the
stadium has been used creatively in asset
management. Despite being unpopular with fans,
mergers have been done successfully – Dagenham &
Redbridge, Ebbsfleet (formerly Gravesend & Northfleet),
Havant & Waterlooville, Hinckley United (formerly
Hinckley Athletic and Hinckley Town), Rushden &
Diamonds, and Solihull Moors (formerly Solihull
Borough and Moor Green).
Type 5: The ‘repeat offenders’
A number of clubs have faced insolvency events on
more than one occasion. These are listed in Table 1.
There are thus 17 instances of an insolvency event
reoccurring. The frequency at which these re-events
have occurred is set out in Table 2: 47% are within
four years of the previous event; 68% are within seven
years. The relatively rapid re-occurrence may, from
one perspective, be unsurprising – the first occurrence
implies that the club was already in a weak financial
position; factors such as poor attendance at matches,
with resultant poor revenue streams, might be
expected to be a continuing problem. However, it
might also be argued that lessons had not been
learned. Table 3 shows the debts of the clubs at the
time of the insolvency events. 
Only in the cases of Darlington (2009), Luton Town
(2007), possibly Rotherham United (2008), Swansea
City (2003) and Swindon Town (2002) were the
debts at a lower level than in the preceding insolvency
event. This is a surprising outcome as in the preceding
insolvency it would have been typical for some of the
ambient debt to have been written off in agreement
with the creditors (paying perhaps as little as 10p in
the £), and again typically the club would have been
bought from the Administrator by a new owner with
an injection of cash to put the club back on to a firm
financial basis. Possible explanations for this are
naivety on the part of new owners (as for example
with the 19-year-old new owner of Aldershot Town,
Spencer Trethewy), inability to reduce costs (at
Rotherham United, for example, where the recovery of
the stadium by the ex-Chairman, Ken Booth, in lieu of
repayment of loans, resulted in a rent charge of
approximately £200,000 a year, which the club felt
unable to meet when attendances fell to below 4,000)
and/or reduced revenues resulting frequently from
relegation. It must be noted that falling into
Administration may be the cause of a relegation with
the introduction of the 10 point penalty in 2003 (see
Beech, 2009, for a discussion of the dysfunctional
outcomes of points deductions).
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ALDERSHOT (1990; 1992)
BOURNEMOUTH (1997; 2008)
BRADFORD CITY (2002; 2004)
CRAWLEY TOWN (1999; 2006)
DARLINGTON (1997; 2003; 2009)
EXETER CITY (1994; 2003)
HALIFAX TOWN (1987; 1999; 2002; 2008)
LUTON TOWN (1999; 2003; 2007)
ROTHERHAM UNITED (1987; 2006; 2008)
SCARBOROUGH (1999; 2003)
SWANSEA CITY (1985; 2003)
SWINDON TOWN (2000; 2002)
WOLVERHAMPTON WANDERERS (1982; 1986)
TABLE 1 Clubs with more than one insolvency event
NO. OF YEARS BETWEEN EVENTS
2
3
4
6
7
9
11
12
18
19
NO. OF OCCURRENCES
4
1
4
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
TABLE 2 Frequency of re-occurrence of an insolvency event
CLUB
ALDERSHOT
BOURNEMOUTH 
BRADFORD CITY 
CRAWLEY TOWN 
DARLINGTON
EXETER CITY
HALIFAX TOWN 
LUTON TOWN 
ROTHERHAM UNITED
SCARBOROUGH 
SWANSEA CITY 
SWINDON TOWN 
WOLVERHAMPTON WANDERERS
1
£0.494M (1990)
£4M (1997)
£33M (2002)
£0.4M (1999)
£5.5M (1997)
£4M (1994)
£0.4M (1987)
£3M (1999)
£0.789M (1987)
£0.6M (1999)
£1.5M (1985)
£3.5M (2000)
?? (1982)
REPORTED DEBTS
2
£1.2M (1992)
£5.8M (2008)
£36M (2004)
£1.4M (2006)
£20M (2003)
£4.5M (2003)
?? (1999)
£11M (2003)
£1M (2006)
£2.5M (2003)
£1.4M (2003)
£1.8M (2002)
?£0.75M (1986)
3
£5M (2009)
£0.6M (2002)
£4.5M (2007)
?? (2008)
4
£3M (2008)
TABLE 3 Clubs with repeat instances of insolvency events
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Conclusion
At this stage in the research project (Phase 2), a
number of general conclusions may be drawn
tentatively. It would appear that insolvency has indeed
become almost a ‘legitimate’ tactic in a football club’s
business strategy. The scale at which it has happened
is summarised in Table 4.
It should be remembered that the figures in Table 4
refer to the present constitutions of the tiers but that
the insolvency events may have occurred while a club
was in membership of a different tier. Table 5 shows a
breakdown by tiers at the time of the insolvency event.
Clubs are thus at their most vulnerable in Tier 4.
However, as this data includes the pre-commercialised
era of modern football, the tendency will be for the
peak to drift towards Tiers 5 and 6. At these levels,
they were historically amateur clubs, which typically
have professionalised on promotion but are showing
no evidence of giving up professional status when
relegated, thus putting themselves under financial
pressure. For example, in the summer break of 2008
Northwich Victoria paid its players £70,000
notwithstanding that their average attendance during
the previous season had been only 829 and the club
faced debts reported to be millions of pounds.
Five types have been identified and will be explored
in the third phase of the research project. The types
are not mutually exclusive and any possible causal
links will be explored.
The overall impression of English football clubs is
that they face insolvency at an alarming rate and too
few have developed sustainable business models to
avoid it, or even avoid a repetition of insolvency.
While the calls for further punishment such as
compulsory relegation are understandable, they
approach the issue as a problem whose symptoms
need treating, rather than one whose causes need
TIER
1 – PREMIER LEAGUE
2 – CHAMPIONSHIP
3 – FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1
4 – FOOTBALL LEAGUE 2
5 – CONFERENCE NATIONAL
6 – CONFERENCE NORTH & SOUTH
NO. OF CLUBS
20
24
24
24
24
44
% THAT HAVE SUFFERED AN INSOLVENCY EVENT
20%
46%
54%
62.5%
33%
5%
TABLE 4 Percentage of clubs by current membership of tier that have suffered an insolvency event
TIER
1 – CURRENTLY PREMIER LEAGUE
2 – CURRENTLY CHAMPIONSHIP
3 – CURRENTLY FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1
4 – CURRENTLY FOOTBALL LEAGUE 2
5 – CURRENTLY CONFERENCE NATIONAL
6 – CURRENTLY CONFERENCE NORTH & SOUTH
7 – AND LOWER
% THAT SUFFERED AN INSOLVENCY EVENT WHILE IN THE TIER
0%
15%
21%
30%
15%
11%
7%
TABLE 5 Percentage of clubs by membership of tier when insolvency event occurred
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treating. Again, this issue will be further investigated in
the third phase of the research. Specific lines of enquiry
into the causes of club indebtedness will include:
• the extent to which indebtedness arises from ‘finite
benefaction’ – the cases where a benefactor has
made substantial loans to a club in the form of
‘soft’ debt but has ultimately sought the return of
the loans
• the extent to which clubs prepare a ‘Plan B’
allowing for the eventuality of relegation
• the extent to which the current disparity in
financial operating levels, i.e. the scale of revenues
and costs, between the different tiers in the 
football pyramid exacerbate the difficulty of
financial planning
• the extent to which clubs adopt realistic
wages/revenues targets, and the extent to which
they meet them.
English football is a sport that is well into the post-
commercialised phase of its development (Beech,
2004). As such, it is currently offering an exemplar of
how not to run a sports business. By surfacing the
root causes of the problem it is hoped that lessons can
be learned for other sports at the height of their
commercialisation phase.
A note on the database
The database consists of data files on all clubs
discovered to have faced an insolvency event. In the
course of Phase 1 it became clear that a number of
clubs had come within a hair’s breadth of an
insolvency event (Coventry City, for example, coming
within 30 minutes of Administration in 2007), and
currently files have been built on the 116 clubs in the
top five tiers and a further 40 on clubs who have
suffered or nearly suffered insolvency events.
Data have been drawn from the following 
sources: BBC News website; Google; LexisNexis (the
e-database of newspaper articles from 1985); club
websites; supporters trust websites; Wyn Grant’s The
Political Economy of Football website; the Clubs in
Crisis website; and the current and archive websites of
local and national newspapers.
For earlier insolvency events, club-specific books,
such as Allan and Bevington (1996), have been used.
Data on promotion and relegation have been taken
from the Football Club History database.
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